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UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW
SUMMER 1981

VOLUME 6

NUMBER 2

RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN OHIO
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS:
A PREFERRED APPROACH
James J. Ross*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages in tort law, awarded to the plaintiff in addition
to full compensation for injuries, are said to punish the defendant, to
restrain him from committing the same act again, and to deter others
from following his example.' Nevertheless, "[slomething more than
the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.
There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage .... or such a

conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that [the
defendant's] conduct may be called wilful or wanton." 2
An anomalous area exists in the awarding of punitive damages.
Under the general rule, punitive damages cannot be awarded in a
wrongful death action unless the governing provision expressly or by
clear implication confers the right to such damages.' The reason given
for this rule is that punitive damages are mere incidents to the cause of
action, a windfall to the decedent's representative who suffered no personal injury." American courts have universally accepted the rule that a
civil action for wrongful death was not recognized at common law and
that no such cause of action may be maintained except under statute.'
Furthermore, the statutes creating such a cause of action have been
construed as not authorizing the imposition of exemplary damages."
* B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College, 1976; M.P.A., Univ. of Tenn. at Knoxville,
1977; J.D., Ohio Northern Univ., 1980. Associate with Evans, Steege and McNees,
Beaver Falls, Pa.
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W.

PROSSER).
2. Id. at 9-10.

3. Wallace v. Ener, 521 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rep. 14 (1976); Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J.
Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967); Kollin v. Shaff, 79 Misc. 2d 49, 359 N.Y.S.2d 515
(Sup. Ct. 1974); Greene v. Nichols, 274 N.C. 18, 161 S.E.2d 521 (1968); Rubeck v.
Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978).
4. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 13.

5. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Malone].
6. See generally 61 A.L.R.3d 906-14 (1975). The greatest common obstacle to
recognition of the common law right of recovery today seems to lie in the fact that
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As a result of this construction, it may be cheaper for the defendant to
kil, rather than injure, the victim. A defendant who wilfully or wantonly injures a victim may be forced to pay punitive damages in addition to compensating the victim for any injury incurred; whereas, a
defendant who kills a victim while engaged in the same wilful or wanton act will not be required to pay punitive damages.
This anomaly will be examined by focusing specifically upon Ohio
law. The historical setting of wrongful death actions must first be
analyzed, however, because the present status of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions can be properly understood only in light of
past developments. An explanation of the Ohio approach to this area
will follow. Additionally, current trends in this area will be examined
in order to compare and contrast the Ohio position and to develop
grounds for liberalization and reform. Finally, a preferred approach to
the area will be offered: an approach that appears more logical considering the purposes behind an award of punitive damages.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

"In a sense [a wrongful death action] is a novel of the nineteenth
century, a story of the new swarming into crowded cities, the travail of
the factory.. .. "I Until the nineteenth century, unnatural or wrongful
death meant primarily death by murder. 8 The assailant was incarcerated or executed as a result of his unlawful deeds. In this setting,
no right of action existed in favor of the heirs, the distributees, or the
personal representatives of the deceased person for damages from the
wrongful death.' Any cause of action available to the injured person,
abated with his death. 10 Case law precedent for this rule was establishlegislatures have almost univergally enacted statutes which are regarded by the courts

as occupying the field. In general, the restrictions under such statutes limit the person
who may maintain an action, the beneficiaries and the amounts and elements of
damages recoverable.
7. Malone, supra note 5, at 1043.
8. Id.
9.

Craig, Damages Recoverable For Wrongful Death, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 213

(1971) [hereinafter cited as Craig].
10. The notion that claims for injuries to the person did not survive the death of
the victim harmonized with the attitude that prevailed in early English history. The
subordinates at common law, wife and children, had no property interests concurrent
with or equal to the superior, husband and father. Therefore, these inferiors never enjoyed any recognized right in either the safety or the life of the superior. Other probable origins of the rule denying a cause of action at common law were: (1) the civil
cause of action were merged into the criminal wrong when a cause of action disclosed
the commission of a felony and (2)the supposed aversion by common law courts to the
placing of a crude monetary value upon the sacred life of a human being. See Malone,
supra note 5, at .1044-53.
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ed in the 1808 English case of Baker v. Bolton." Dicta in Baker supplied the precedent for the rule that the death of a human being could
not be complained of as an injury.II The rule of Baker became the law
in England and later became firmly entrenched in the United States.
"Then, suddently at mid-century society faced up in panic to a virtually new phenomenon -accidental death through corporate enterprise."'" Spurred by this new development, the English Parliament
adopted the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, otherwise known as Lord
Campbell's Act."' This act, which created a statutory cause of action,
marked the first recognition of a cause of action for damages for
wrongful death.' 5 "Recovery was limited to designated beneficiaries
and damages were awarded based upon the pecuniary loss to those surviving. The jury was permitted6 to give such damages as they [believed]
proportionate to the injury." '
Lord Campbell's Act provided the model for a majority of the
"death acts" that now exist in the United States.' 7 Following their
English counterparts American courts have recognized that a cause of
action for wrongful death did not exist at common law and that no
action could be maintained except under statute. Furthermore,
American courts have generally adhered to a strict interpretation of the
statutes and awarded no more than the statutes permit.
THE OHIO APPROACH

Every state now provides a statutory remedy for wrongful death. '
The majority of states have statutes modeled after Lord Campbell's
Act which create "a new cause of action for the death in favor of the
deceddnt's personal representative for the benefit of certain designated
persons."9 These "death acts" essentially serve to create a new cause
of action in the beneficiaries to compensate them for the loss of the
11. 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Nisi Prius 1808).
12. In Baker v. Bolton, the bereaved husband had lost his wife in a stagecoach accident and subsequently brought suit to recover his loss. In the Baker opinion, Lord
Ellenborough held, without citing controlling authority or precedent, that a husband
had no cause of action for the loss of his wife's services. Craig, supra note 9, at 215.
13. Malone, supra note 5, at 1043.
14. Craig, supra note 9, at 216.
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 1,at 902. The statute created a new cause of action
for the death in favor of the decedent's personal representative for the benefit of certain designated persons.
16. Craig, supra note 9, at 216. Only those persons designated as permissible
beneficiaries under the Act could recover.
17. 22 AM. JuR. 2d Death § 2 (1965).
18. W. PROSSER, supra, note 1, at 902.
19. Id.
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pecuniary benefit of the decedent. 2" A minority of states have survival
statutes, "which proceed upon the theory of preserving the cause of
action vested in the decedent at the moment of his death and enlarging
it to include the damages resulting from his death."'" Under the survival statutes, the decedent's personal representative has the right to
carry on any cause of action which the decedent had the right to commence. One commentator 22 suggests that the distinction between
modern wrongful death statutes and survival statutes has been
obliterated. Many states, however, still adhere to the traditional
distinction noted above.
Some states, including Ohio,2 3 have both wrongful death and survival statutes. In these states, two causes of action exist which may be
prosecuted concurrently. If both actions are successful, recovery for
"pain and suffering, expenses and loss of earnings of the decedent up
to the date of his death"2 " is allocated to the survival action and, consequently, to the decedent's estate. Recovery for the loss of benefits to
the survivors, on the other hand, is allocated to the action for
wrongful death, and thus to the beneficiaries.2 5
The first Ohio statute providing an action for wrongful death was
passed in 1851.26 Before that date, Ohio courts would not entertain
such an action. 2" Since then the Ohio decisions have maintained a patent consistency on the issue of permissible damage awards in wrongful
death actions. In one of the earlier and more significant cases, Kennedy v. Byers,28 the Ohio State Supreme Court held that the rights
conferred by the Ohio wrongful death statute are accompanied by the
limitations imposed by that statute. More specifically, the court stated
20. "Under rather less than one-third of the death acts, the discretion of the jury
is at least partly controlled by a maximum limit of recovery on behalf of all
beneficiaries for a single death." Id. at 910.
21. Id. at 902.
22. Comment, Punitive Damages In Wrongful Death, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301,
301-02 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Punitive Damages In Wrongful Death] The author
asserts that there was a historic distinction between wrongful death and survival
actions in that a wrongful death action created a new cause of action in the
beneficiaries to compensate them for pecuniary loss as a result of the death, while a
survival action gave the decedent's personal representative the right to carry on any
cause of action which the decedent started. Without citing authority or giving his
reasons in detail, the author contends that the distinction is no longer important.
23. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976) & § 2305.21 (Page 1954).
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 905.
25. Id.
26. An Act Requiring Compensation For Causing Death by Wrongful, Neglect on
Default, 49 Ohio Laws 117 (1851).
27. Karr v. Sixt, 146 Ohio St. 527, 532, 67 N.E.2d 331, 334 (1946).
28. 107 Ohio St. 90, 140 N.E. 630 (1923).
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that "[w]here the word 'damages' is limited by statute by the word
'pecuniary' the award cannot go beyond the pecuniary or money loss
sustained by the beneficiaries." 9
In deciding Kennedy, the Ohio Supreme Court deferred to a
United States Supreme Court decision, American R.R. Co. of Puerto
Rico v. Didricksen,30 as controlling authority. In Didricksen, the
Supreme Court stated:
The cause of action which was created in behalf of the injured employee
did not survive his death, nor pass to his representatives. But the act, in
case of the death of such an employee from his injury, creates a new and
distinct right of action for the benefit of the dependent relatives named in
the statute. The damages recoverable are limited to such loss as results to
them because they have been deprived of a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefits by the wrongful death of the injured employee. The
damage is limited strictly to the financial loss thus sustained."
A more recent Ohio Supreme Court case, Karr v. Sixt, 3" reaffirmed the
rationale set forth in Kennedy and Didricksen by strictly construing the
statute governing wrongful death actions.33
In the most recent major case in this area, Rubeck v. Huffman,3"
the Ohio Supreme Court did nothing to undermine or to deviate from
this precedent. Rubeck involved a motor vehicle accident between
Clair B. Rubeck, deceased, and George V. Huffman, defendant. Huffman was traveling west on the east-bound lane of a state highway when
he collided head-on with Rubeck's vehicle. The injuries to Rubeck
were fatal; consequently, an action for wrongful death was instituted
by Paul Rubeck, as executor of Clair Rubeck's estate. At trial, the
plaintiff produced evidence showing that the defendant was inebriated
at the time of the accident. The trial court gave judgment for, and the
court of appeals upheld, awards of compensatory and punitive
damages. On an appeal to certify the record, the Ohio Supreme Court
29.
30.

Id. at 93, 140 N.E. at 632.
227 U.S. 145 (1913). In Didrickson, the plaintiffs, surviving parents of Pedro

Didrickson, brought an action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act of April 22,
1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, to recover for the loss of their son, who died from an injury

sustained while employed by the American Railroad Co. of Puerto Rico.
31.
32.

227 U.S. at 149.
146 Ohio St. 526, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946).

33. The court noted that a wrongful death action is for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse, children and other next of kin to compensate them for pecuniary
injury resulting from the death and, further, that pecuniary loss does not comprehend
such injury as bereavement or mental pain and suffering. Id. at 532-37, 67 N.E.2d at
335-36.
34.

54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978).
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affirmed the award of compensatory damages, but reversed the lower
courts' decisions awarding punitive damages.
In reversing the punitive damage award, the Ohio Supreme Court
scrutinized Ohio's wrongful death statute since the right to sue for
wrongful death in Ohio is statutorily created. 3" The statute limits the
type of damages which may be awarded in a wrongful death action
under Ohio Revised Code Section 2125.02. 1 Punitive damages are
considered to be supplemental to that amount necessary to compensate
an injured party.37 Therefore, an award of punitive damages conflicts
with a statutory provision which limits damages in wrongful death actions to pecuniary loss.
Ranells v. Cleveland,38 was cited in Rubeck as controlling authority
for the denial of punitive damages. In Ranells, the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that "[plunitive damages are assessed over and above the
amount adequate to compensate an injured party. As such, they are
nothing less than a windfall . . ."I"to the heirs who suffer pecuniary
loss, but are not personally wronged by the misconduct.
Justice William Brown's dissent in Ranells presents an alternative
view to an award of punitives in wrongful death actions. Brown contended that the defendant's acts constituted reckless and wanton con4
duct in that there was an utter disregard for human safety. '
Therefore, to Justice Brown, this was an appropriate case for an award
of punitive damages. Brown advocated a liberalization of what he considered to be an antiquated approach-a judgment "requiring a statute
expressly authorizing punitive damage awards . . . simply places the

cart before the horse."'" To date, Brown's dissent remains an empty
plea in Ohio.
35. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page 1976).
36. In accordance with Ohio Revised Code § 2125.02, damages in a wrongful
death action are limited to pecuniary loss only.
37. Ranells v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 7, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975).
38. 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 885 (1975).
39. Id. at 10, 321 N.E.2d at 889 (Brown, J., dissenting).
40. Id. In Ranells, a severe electrical storm cut off power in a pumping station
and filtration plant, which were integral parts of the City of Cleveland's Water Department. To prevent damage to the evaporators at the filtration plant, it became necessary
to shut off three tanks from which liquid chlorine had been flowing. The chemical
house operator entered the darkened chlorine room and attempted to close the value to
each tank "by feel". While doing so, he detected a leak. He waited until power was
restored and returned to change a washer. However, he neglected to make sure that the
value was completely closed. As a result of his negligence, a great deal of chlorine gas
escaped into the room, forcing the operator to flee. The operator then proceeded to
activate a blower, which drew the gas from the chlorine room and into the atmosphere.
As a result of chlorine gas inhalation, Richard Ranells, who resided in the residential
neighborhood adjoining the plant, died.
41. Id. at 10, 321 N.E.2d at 890.
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An award of punitive damages is permitted in Ohio under the surVival statute if plaintiff can prove that the deceased suffered personal
injury or property loss prior to death. "The right to punitive damages
continues even when the person so injured has died and the personal
injury or property loss claim is pursued by the representative of his
estate under Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.21.""I Ohio has long
recognized that a survival action for personal injury, which survives to
the personal representative, and a wrongful death action, are separate
and distinct actions brought under different statutory provisions.
They (the two actiohs] rest primarily upon the same alleged negligence of
the defendant and the same absence of contributory negligence of the injured person, but in the revived action the damages are for the personal
injuries to the injured person for which an action would lie if death had
not ensued, and such damages to enure when recovered to the benefit of
the estate, while in the later action the suit is prosecuted in the interest of
other parties and the measure of damages is the pecuniary loss they have
sustained by death.'"
It is therefore necessary for the decedent's representative to prove that
the decedent suffered property loss or personal injury before death, as
well as the necessary requisites for punitive damages,"' in order to
recover punitive damages under the survival statute.
Despite the ability to recover punitive damages under the Ohio survival statute, an inequity is apparent. It is not always possible to prove
that the decedent suffered personal injury or property loss prior to his
death; for example, the decedent may die instantly. In such a case, the
personal representative is denied punitive damages." ' Furthermore, the
representative cannot collect them under the wrongful death statute. 4
This evidences an absence of logic and coherency in the Ohio approach. There is no sound reason for distinguishing a wrongful death
action from any other tort proceeding. The present status of the law
overlooks wilful and wanton conduct in a wrongful death action, yet
permits punishment by punitive damages in a negligence action for a
broken leg. It is indeed unfortunate that an award of punitive damages
in an Ohio wrongful death action is based upon chance; that is, the
42. Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d at 23, 374 N.E.2d at 413. Note that Ohio
Revised Code section § 2305.21 is the survival statute and is a cause of action separate
from a wrongful death action.
43. Mahoning Valley Ry. v. Van Alstine, 77 Ohio St. 395, 414, 83 N.E. 601, 607

(1908).

44. See notes 69 & 70 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the
recovery of punitive damages in Ohio.
45. See text accompanying notes 42-44 supra.
46. See notes 26-39 and accompanying text supra.
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personal representative can only hope that the decedent lives long
enough after the accident to suffer personal injury or property loss as a
result of the defendant's wilful and wanton conduct.
CURRENT TRENDS

Ohio is one of the 34" states which do not allow exemplary
damages in wrongful death actions. Also included within this majority
are the two most influential jurisdictions, California and New York."
"The California statutes and decisions have been interpreted to bar the
recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death case." 9 Similarly, in
New York, recovery in wrongful death actions is limited by statute to
fair and just compensation for the "pecuniary injuries resulting from
the decedent's death to the person for whose benefit the action is
brought. In all other actions to recover damages for injury to person
or property brought on behalf of a decedent, punitive damages shall
not be awarded nor penalties adjudged." 5
A minority of jurisdictions permit an award of punitive damages in
wrongful death actions." In these jurisdictions, however, the decedent
must have met his death as the result of a wilful or wanton act of the
defendant. 2 Alabama emerges as the most unique jurisdiction in
awarding wrongful death damages. While the majority of jurisdictions
completely deny punitive damages in wrongful death actions" and a
small minority allow punitive in addition to compensatory damages if
the defendant is guilty of wilful or wanton conduct, s' all damages
recoverable under the Alabama statute are considered punitive
damages." Iowa has enacted a hybrid statute which, unlike Ohio,
47. See Punitive Damages In Wrongful Death, supra note 22, at 302.
48. California and New York are considered trendsetters in the judicial field. For
example, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), the California Supreme Court adopted strict products liability.
In a short period thereafter many other jurisdictions followed suit by adopting strict
products liability. This is but one of many trends whose origins can be attributed to
New York or California Supreme Court decisions.
49. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450, 551 P.2d 334, 353,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1976).
50. Kollin v. Shaff, 79 Misc. 2d 49, 50-51, 359 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
51. Punitive DamagesIn Wrongful Death, supra note 22, at 308. These states are

Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
West Virginia.
52. Id.
53. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977); Geohagon v. General Motors
Corp., 219 Ala. 151, 279 So. 2d 436 (1973).
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combines survival actions and wrongful death actions under one
statutory provision.S6 Under this hybrid statute, the submission of exemplary damages is considered proper."
Many "[clommentators are beginning to realize that there is simply
no logical reason to extinguish the right to punitives simply because the
injury is fatal. Often courts deny punitives because of precedent with
no other logical reason."" An Illinois appellate court evidenced this
fact in Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co.," wherein an award of
punitive damages was disallowed based upon a statutory interpretation
of the Illinois survival statute. In examining the plaintiff's claim for
punitive damages in an action brought under the survival act, the court
reasoned that allowing an award of punitive damages "would once and
for all put to rest the old adage that it is cheaper to kill your victim
than to leave him maimed."" The court noted that "[d]espite its]
highest desires .

.

. law is not always based upon logical rationale.''"

The court concluded that the law could not support an award of
punitive damages in an action brought under the statute.
As noted before, punitive damages are intended to serve as a deterrent. Thus, in not allowing punitive awards in wrongful death actions,
the courts are permitting the defendant to "get away with murder" 2
and indirectly encouraging the same conduct by others.
The plea for reform, however, has not gone completely unnoticed.
In 1977, the United States District Court for the Central District of
California was faced with the issue of whether denial of punitive
damages in a wrongful death action is violative of equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by United States and California Constitutions.6 3
"The district court ruled that a state's statute (California) denying
punitives in a wrongful death action denies equal protection to
wrongful death claimants since only they, unlike property damage and
personal injury claimants, are barred from recovering punitives. '"..
The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court and held that
the distinction drawn in the California statute was rational. Therefore,
56. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 611.20 (West 1950).
57. See Koppinger v. Cullen-Schlitz & Assoc., 513 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1975).
58. Belli, Punitive Damages: An Historical Approach, 13 TRIAL 40, 44 (Dec.
1977) (hereinafter cited as Belli].
59. 21 IIl. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974).
60. Id. at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
61. Id.
62. Belli, supra note 58, at 44.
63. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980).
64. Belli, supra note 58, at 44.
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the statute was constitutional under both the federal and the California
equal protection clauses."
A PREFERRED APPROACH

Some courts and commentators now argue that logic and public
policy dictate a need for a more liberal interpretation of wrongful
death statutes. Thus, it is desirable to offer a preferred approach to an
award of punitive damages in a wrongful death action, an approach
that is logical in light of the purpose behind punitive damage awards.
A punitive damage award is given to the plaintiff over and above
full compensation for his injuries in order to punish the defendant, to
restrain the defendant from doing the same thing again, and to deter
others from performing such acts." Mere negligence, however, is not a
sufficient basis for a punitive damage award. "There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or 'malice,' or a
fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton." 6" The defendant's motive and conduct, rather
than the particular tort committed, is the determinative factor in
awarding punitive damages.
Ohio courts are permitted to award punitive damages in tort cases
involving personal injury or property loss. 68 "In Ohio, in accord with
the weight of the authority, punitive damages are allowed as a punishment to the offender, and as an example to deter others from offending in a like manner." 6 9 "The Ohio rule allowing a recovery of
punitive or exemplary damages is, as the statement of the rule implies,
predicated upon the circumstance that the wrong complained of involves ingredients of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless
disregard of plaintiff's rights."" A close analysis of these established
principles reveals that the emphasis in awarding punitive damages is
upon the defendant's conduct in committing the tort, rather than upon
the result of his conduct. If the defendant recklessly and wantonly
disregard's the victim's rights, he should be forced to pay punitive
damages as a punishment regardless of whether the victim dies or is
only injured. It is indeed illogical to deny a punitive damage award in
all Ohio wrongful death actions.
65. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 622 F.2d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980).
66. See note I and accompanying text supra.
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 9-10.
68. See Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183, 327 N.E.2d 654,
658 (1957).
69. Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 425, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229 (1946).
70. Id. at 428, 66 N.E.2d at 230.
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While the Ohio approach to punitive damages in a wrongful death
action appears illogical and antiquated, the Alabama approach (all
damages recoverable are punitive damages) is no improvement. One
may collect punitive damages under the Alabama statute even in the
absence of wilful or wanton conduct. What is desirable is a compromise between the Ohio approach and the Alabama approach-an
approach that would permit an award of punitive damages if the decedent is killed by the wilful or wanton act of the tortfeasor. A comparison of two cases can best illustrate this preferred approach.
In Rubeck v. Huffman,"' the defendant caused a fatal head-on collision. At trial, the plaintiff established that the defendant was inebriated at the time of the accident; nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme
Court denied punitive damages in the ensuing wrongful death action
which was instituted by the executor of the decedent's estate. No doubt
exists that the defendant's drunken driving constituted a reckless
disregard for the safety of others. Therefore, punitive damages should
have been awarded as a punishment to the defendant and as an exam2
ple to deter others from acting in a like manner.' Defendant's conduct
constituted more than mere negligence. The circumstances of aggravation and outrage, which are necessary prerequisites for a punitive
damage award, were unequivocally present. To deny punitive damages
under these circumstances defies our sense of moral decency.
Punitive damages are not, however, warranted in every wrongful
death action. In Karrv. Sixt," the decedent, an eight-year-old boy, lived
with his father and brother on a farm. He was killed in a collision with a
large tractor-trailer as he was riding a child's wagon on a public highway
near his home. Evidence as to the question of negligence was conflicting.
In fact, there was a strong possibility of contributory negligence since
the decedent was riding the wagon, without lights, on a public highway
at night. Furthermore, there was no evidence of wilful or wanton conduct. Obviously, this was not a proper case for the imposition of
punitive damages. The defendant's misconduct, if any, constituted mere
negligence; and as previously stated, mere negligence is not a sufficient
basis for a punitive damage award.
The preferred approach can be succinctly summarized; the rule
that applies to awarding punitive damages in tort cases involving personal injury or property loss should also apply to wrongful death actions. That is, if the decedent is killed as a result of a defendant's
wilful or wanton conduct, the decedent's personal representative
71.
72.
73.

54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 374 N.E.2d 411 (1978).
See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E.2d 331 (1946).
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should be permitted to recover punitive damages. This approach is
logical and consistent with the purpose and policy behind punitive
damage awards.
CONCLUSION

The present construction of the Ohio wrongful death statute holds
that the right to punish a tortfeasor who is guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct terminates when a decedent is the victim of a wrongful death.
In essence, the Ohio courts have strictly construed the wrongful death
statute, and since the statute does not unequivocally provide for
punitive damages, the courts have refused to award them. Nevertheless, a new movement is in the offing to usurp this strict construction
of wrongful death statutes. The present trend in a small minority of
the states is to allow punitives in wrongful death actions. In many
other states, the argument is raised that public policy mandates a more
liberal interpretation. A logical approach would permit an award of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions where the decedent is killed as the result of a wilful or wanton act of another. Perhaps in the not
too distant future, Ohio may finally put to rest the proverb that it is
cheaper to kill the victim than to injure him.
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